Kenya’s plan to monetise government data raises questions that extend far beyond Nairobi. As data becomes one of the world’s most valuable resources, governments across the continent are beginning to ask who should capture the value created by the continent’s growing digital footprint.
Earlier this month, Kenya’s Ministry of ICT published its draft National Data Governance Policy. Buried within it is an idea that feels quietly significant; a formal marketplace where anonymised and aggregated datasets drawn from government platforms, including eCitizen, could be made available to businesses, researchers and NGOs.
A dedicated council would oversee the initiative, with a target of releasing 1,000 datasets over five years, including anonymised records on transport, agriculture, business, health statistics, education and other public services.
If implemented, Kenya would join a small group of countries experimenting with the idea that governments should not simply collect data, but actively manage and monetise it.
Across parts of Europe, Asia and the Gulf states, governments increasingly describe data as a strategic national asset. Artificial intelligence has only accelerated that thinking. AI systems require enormous amounts of information. Countries that control high-quality datasets possess something increasingly valuable.
Public data already exists. Transport records, business registrations, agricultural statistics and economic activity can be anonymised and transformed into tools for researchers and businesses. Better information can improve products, make governments more efficient and create entirely new industries.
Kenya’s proposed framework embraces what policymakers call the “once only” principle. Citizens provide information to the state once and authorised agencies share it across interconnected systems rather than repeatedly asking for the same information.
Anonymity is not always permanent. Large datasets have an awkward tendency to reveal more than their creators intended. Information that appears harmless in isolation can become identifiable when combined with other datasets. What begins as efficiency can slowly become surveillance, or at least the perception of it.
The harder challenge isn’t technical. It’s creating the rules, institutions and public confidence strong enough to ensure that people trust how their data is collected, shared and used. And Kenya is not alone in navigating these tensions.
In 2025, Nigeria deepened its data governance framework through the General Application and Implementation Directive (GAID), issued by the Nigeria Data Protection Commission. The directive provides detailed guidance on consent, accountability, data processing and cross-border transfers, reflecting the same recognition that data protection is becoming an essential part of national digital infrastructure.
South Africa’s Protection of Personal Information Act is already in force. Rwanda has built its own framework. Egypt and Morocco continue refining theirs. The African Union’s Malabo Convention, though progressing slowly, points towards an eventual continental architecture for data governance.
Today, much of the continent’s digital activity takes place on foreign platforms. Consider the Nairobi logistics company whose route data sits inside a foreign mapping platform. Or the Lagos fintech whose transaction records pass through an international payment processor. Or the Moroccan manufacturer whose supply chain data lives in cloud infrastructure headquartered elsewhere. In each case, the data is generated in Africa. The value it creates, however, the patterns, the predictions, the commercial intelligence, often accrues elsewhere. Data sovereignty is becoming as important as digital connectivity.
But sovereignty brings responsibilities. Monetising public data requires institutions strong enough to govern it, regulators capable of enforcing standards and citizens willing to trust that their information will not be abused. Those institutions are still evolving, which is perhaps why Kenya’s proposal matters beyond the continent itself.
France recently moved to replace the American data analytics firm Palantir in parts of its intelligence infrastructure, citing concerns over strategic dependence. In Britain, parliamentary pressure has prompted a review of the NHS’s £330 million data contract with the same company. Whether in Nairobi, London or Paris, governments are arriving at the same realisation; control over digital infrastructure increasingly means control over economic value.
Every government will eventually face the same question. Not whether data has value, but who captures that value, who governs it, and how much trust citizens are willing to place in the institutions that manage it.
The next phase of Africa’s digital economy may depend on the answer.
What We’re Watching
- Who acquires the Ghana business, and what does that reveal about the balance of power between local, regional and international banks?
- Do Kenya and Nigeria remain Standard Chartered’s long-term consumer banking exceptions, or become the next markets under review?
- Does the shift stop at retail, or do regional banks and initiatives such as PAPSS begin to challenge international institutions further up the corporate and cross-border banking chain?
